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INTRODUCTION 
Of the many debatable features of the United States’ civil justice 
system, punitive damages may be one of the most derided.  Designed 
to punish defendants for especially egregious conduct or to provide 
optimum deterrence when compensatory damages are insufficient, 
punitive damages are often awarded in an incoherent manner.  The 
high levels of variation in awards have led many scholars—and 
judges—to question whether punitive damages are appropriate in 
most cases.1  In response to these concerns, the Supreme Court has 
recently attempted to rein in punitive damages, chiefly in BMW  of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore,2 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell,3 and Philip Morris USA v. Williams.4  The holdings in the first 
two cases rest on the Fourteenth Amendment’s doctrine of substantive 
due process—that is, that the excessiveness of some awards may offend 
the Constitution.5  In Williams, however, the Court invoked procedural 
due process (i.e., the process through which juries decide punitive 
damages) as another limit on awards.6  Although Williams’s holding is 
arguably narrow, the case may signal the Court’s willingness to re-
evaluate the problem of arbitrary punitive damages awards.7 
One highly visible area in which the Court has evaluated the pro-
cedural requirements of a certain punishment is the death penalty, 
specifically in the context of the Eighth Amendment.  In Furman v. 
Georgia,8 the Court decided, in a brief per curiam opinion, that Geor-
gia’s death penalty statute violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
 
1 See infra Section I.B (discussing critiques of punitive damages). 
2 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
3 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
4 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
5 See BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 562 (discussing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s ban on “grossly excessive” punishments (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416-17 (citing BMW’s discussion of due process).  Note 
that one of the Court’s most recent punitive damages cases, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
was grounded in the Court’s authority to enact common law rules pursuant to its mari-
time jurisdiction.  See 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008) (“Exxon raises an issue of first im-
pression about punitive damages in maritime law, which falls within a federal court’s 
jurisdiction . . . .”). 
6 See Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (“[W]e need now only consider the Constitution’s 
procedural limitations.”). 
7 Cf. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24 (1991) (finding no procedural 
due process defect with Alabama’s punitive damages regime). 
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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“cruel and unusual punishments”9 as incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.10  This case in essence found 
death penalty statutes that lead to the arbitrary infliction of capital 
punishment to be “cruel and unusual.”  In other words, a constitu-
tional death penalty statute should produce similar sentences for simi-
lar capital defendants.  In response to Furman, Georgia developed a 
variety of procedural protections in capital sentencing cases, which 
the Court later held to meet the requirements of the Eighth Amend-
ment in Gregg v. Georgia.11 
The Eighth Amendment has no bearing on civil penalties, includ-
ing punitive damages.12  However, the Court in Furman did not follow 
typical Eighth Amendment reasoning; rather, the Court’s focus on the 
arbitrariness of the death penalty appears more akin to a procedural 
due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Further, 
there is some support for the notion that Furman is properly unders-
tood as a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process holding.13  
Thus, plaintiffs seeking to challenge the constitutionality of punitive 
damages have two arguments to make.  First, plaintiffs can argue that 
Furman is a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process case di-
rectly applicable to other types of jury verdicts.  Second, plaintiffs can 
argue that, in any event, the rationale underlying Furman should serve 
as persuasive authority in the procedural due process realm.  Since 
Furman at its core is concerned with the arbitrariness of capital pu-
nishment, the arbitrary imposition of punitive damages should pose 
procedural due process issues similar to the Eighth Amendment prob-
lem in Furman.  If this is the case, the states’ response to Furman can 
also provide constitutional insight into how states could repair their 
punitive damages statutes. 
 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
10 See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text (discussing suggestions that the 
Court’s striking down of death penalty statutes may be due to the statutes’ arbitrari-
ness).  This Comment will refer to “the Eighth Amendment as incorporated against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment” as “the Eighth Amendment” for sim-
plicity’s sake. 
11 See 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that Georgia’s re-
formed death penalty statute did not violate the Constitution). 
12 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 
260 (1989) (holding that the “Excessive Fines Clause” of the Eighth Amendment does 
not apply to punitive damages between private parties).  For arguments that the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause should apply to punitive damages, see generally 
Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages:  Some Lessons from His-
tory, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1987). 
13 See infra Section III.B (discussing Furman as a procedural due process decision). 
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Two decades ago, the Court rejected an argument that one state’s 
imposition of punitive damages was unconstitutionally arbitrary.14  
Thus, defendants seeking to mount a procedural due process chal-
lenge against punitive damages have an uphill battle.  However, the ex-
istence of some support on the current Supreme Court for the notion 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “basic guarantee of nonarbitrary 
governmental behavior” prevents the current arbitrary imposition of 
punitive damages is reassuring.15  More importantly, whether punitive 
damages are being applied arbitrarily is an empirical question:  either 
plaintiffs can show arbitrariness or they cannot.  If mounting empirical 
evidence begins to show more convincingly that punitive damages are 
imposed in an arbitrary fashion, plaintiffs should ask the Court to re-
consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment applies.  If such a chal-
lenge were successful, it is unclear exactly what procedural require-
ments the Court would require for punitive damages.  But Furman—in 
addition to the Court’s current punitive damages jurisprudence and 
behavioral law and economics literature—may provide clues.  More 
importantly, if such a challenge were unsuccessful (or if no plaintiff 
mounted such a challenge), states looking to reform their punitive 
damages law would be well served by a consideration of these factors. 
Although some scholars have noted the similarities between Fur-
man and punitive damages,16 this Comment seeks to analyze these si-
milarities in much greater depth.  Specifically, this Comment argues 
that post-Furman changes provide the clearest example of states ad-
dressing a constitutionally flawed jury decisionmaking process, and 
that the successes and failures of this endeavor should guide states in 
the punitive damages field.  Because recent research—particularly in 
the field of behavioral law and economics17—helps illustrate how and 
why punitive damages are being applied in a nonsensical fashion, 
states are in a unique position to use this research to craft new statutes 
with stronger procedural safeguards.  Furthermore, the Court’s puni-
tive damages jurisprudence continues to provide a separate source of 
guidance for states.18  This Comment seeks to describe these recent 
 
14 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (concluding that the 
punitive damages award at issue did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process). 
15 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 597 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
16 See infra note 171. 
17 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES:  HOW JURIES DECIDE 236 
(2002) (examining juries’ behavior patterns and the effects of cognitive, social, and 
emotional processes on awards of punitive damages). 
18 See infra Part II. 
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insights into the substantive and procedural problems with punitive 
damages and to use both frameworks to suggest a new model for puni-
tive damages statutes. 
Part I of this Comment describes the history of and economic jus-
tifications for punitive damages, as well as various arguments for why 
punitive damages awards are highly variable.  Part II documents the 
Supreme Court’s recent punitive damages case law.  Part III discusses 
the Court’s Furman jurisprudence and criticisms thereof.  Part IV ar-
gues that the Court should reexamine the constitutionality of arbitrary 
punitive damages under procedural due process in light of Furman.  
Barring that possibility, Part IV also argues that states should consider 
all these sources of criticism—the variability of awards, the Court’s 
BMW jurisprudence, and the analogy to the death penalty—in draft-
ing new punitive damages statutes.  Part V presents a model jury in-
struction based on those considerations. 
I.  THEORIES AND CRITIQUES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A.  The History and Theories of Punitive Damages Awards 
 
Punitive damages are hardly a recent development.  Legal systems 
as ancient as the Code of Hammurabi have allowed plaintiffs to recov-
er money above and beyond the measure of adequate compensation, 
especially when a defendant has acted in an especially culpable fa-
shion.19  Other ancient codes, such as the Bible, included provisions 
for punitive damages; these damages also figured heavily in Roman 
law.20  By the eighteenth century, English common law provided “ex-
emplary damages” to plaintiffs when defendants committed “inten-
tional aggravated misconduct.”21  United States common law has fea-
tured punitive damages since at least 1784,22 and the Supreme Court 
 
19 See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI 63 (L.W. King trans., Forgotten Books 2007) (c. 
1760 B.C.E.) (“If a herdsman, to whose care cattle or sheep have been entrusted, be 
guilty of fraud and make false returns of the natural increase, or sell them for money, 
then shall he be convicted and pay the owner ten times the loss.”). 
20 See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages 
Awards:  Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285-86 (1993) (describing 
these sources of law as “precursors to the modern remedy of punitive damages”). 
21 Id. at 1287-90. 
22 See Jacqueline Perczek, Note, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence, and Fairness:  
A Survey of Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
825, 825 (1993) (“Punitive, or exemplary, damages have been part of American tort 
law since 1784.” (footnote omitted)).  These damages came under a variety of names, 
BARON REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  12:20 PM 
858 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 853 
acknowledged the existence of punitive damages in 1818 in The Amia-
ble Nancy.23  Early state courts typically imposed punitive damages 
against defendants who committed violent torts.24  However, courts 
later began to impose punitive damages more frequently against large 
corporations, such as railroad companies, whose gross negligence had 
the potential for serious harm but who could not be prosecuted under 
criminal law.25 
Punitive damages are an “anomaly” of the law, which usually 
awards damages to compensate victims for injuries that they have ac-
tually suffered.26  The division of our justice system into tort and crim-
inal law reflects the separate goals of each—compensation in the case 
of tort law and punishment in the case of criminal law.  By including a 
punitive element in tort law, states blend these different functions, 
creating a hybrid remedy.  When it banned punitive damages in Fay v. 
Parker, New Hampshire’s Supreme Court called them “a monstrous 
heresy . . . deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.”27  To the 
New Hampshire court, commingling the civil justice system with puni-
tive aims was an absurd juxtaposition born out of “a zealous eagerness 
to visit justice and punishment for wrong upon a convicted offender, 
by means of the first judicial process which might happen to bring his 
sins to light.”28  Punitive damages are thus one of the numerous, odd 
intersections between our usually separate justice systems.29 
 
such as “exemplary damages” and “vindictive damages.”  Rustad & Koening, supra 
note 20, at 1292. 
23 See 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818) (“[I]f this were a suit against the origi-
nal wrong-doers, it might be proper to go yet farther, and visit upon them in the 
shape of exemplary damages, the proper punishment which belongs to such lawless 
misconduct.”). 
24 See Rustad & Koening, supra note 20, at 1293-94 (noting the award of punitive 
damages for female plaintiffs in battery and rape cases, as well as punitive awards for 
other malicious acts). 
25 See id. at 1295-97 (“The awarding of exemplary damages was one of the few ef-
fective social control devices used to patrol large powerful interests unimpeded by the 
criminal law.”). 
26 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 57-58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (call-
ing the compensation function of damages a “fundamental premise of our legal system”). 
27 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).  New Hampshire presently allows “liberal” or “en-
hanced” compensatory damages in “exceptional” cases of “wanton, malicious, or op-
pressive” conduct.  Stewart v. Bader, 907 A.2d 931, 942 (N.H. 2006). 
28 Fay, 53 N.H. at 382. 
29 Other examples include the “private attorneys general” theory underlying 42 
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006), which provides for attorneys’ fees in private § 1983 suits, and 
qui tam actions, see The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). 
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Punitive damages are justified in law and economics literature 
chiefly as a means of providing correct levels of deterrence.30  Imagine 
a scenario in which a tortfeasor can evade liability for some harms she 
causes.  If an individual is caught and sued every time she commits a 
tortious act, she will be correctly deterred from committing those acts 
in the future because she knows she will have to pay to offset all of the 
harm she causes.  However, if an individual is caught and sued after 
only half of the tortious acts she commits, the level of deterrence this 
individual feels is only half of what would be optimal.  This individual 
thus has incentives to repeat the tortious act, since she only pays for 
half of the harm she commits.  However, if punitive damages equal to 
compensatory damages may be imposed, the individual will be de-
terred at precisely the optimal level.  Thus, punitive damages cure the 
underdetection problem.31  Similarly, if measuring actual damages is 
difficult for a particular type of tort (for example, defamation), a 
court may wish to impose presumed damages greater than the mean 
amount of harm the tort causes.  Although in some cases this award 
would be supercompensatory (i.e., greater than actual damages), this 
strategy can help prevent underdeterrence if the court’s measure of 
damages, on average, would otherwise be too low.32 
In addition, punitive damages are often justified as a way to pu-
nish reprehensible behavior.33  Economic theories that do not take in-
to account the utility individuals derive from antisocial behavior will 
want to deter this type of behavior.  Imagine an individual who derives 
twice as much enjoyment from assaulting other individuals as her vic-
tims incur suffering.  If no punitive damages are imposed, and even if 
there is full detection, the individual will have incentive to continue 
accosting victims, as she derives surplus utility from the assaults even 
after providing remuneration.34  Furthermore, society’s independent 
sense of morality may dictate that individuals who commit reprehens-
 
30 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 244 
(2004) (discussing the problem of “[e]scape from suit,” in which tortfeasors are not 
held liable for the harms they cause). 
31 See generally id.  Imposing punitive damages to correct for underdetection will 
deter only those tortious acts that are not socially optimal. 
32 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 161 (1987) (“[P]unitive damages may be justified because it is too costly to 
measure actual damages accurately . . . .”). 
33 See Rustad & Koening, supra note 20, at 1293-94 (observing the use of punitive 
damages for malicious acts). 
34 See generally SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 246 (noting further “undesirable reper-
cussions” ensuing from such a situation). 
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ible acts be punished, regardless of whether or not such punishment 
serves the goal of deterrence.  This will be true if society accords utility 
to adherence to its moral dictates, apart from individual utility.  In this 
case, utility may be maximized if society awards punitive damages, in-
dependent of whether society wants to discount the inherent utility 
tortfeasors gain from their tortious acts.35 
B.  Critiques of Punitive Damages 
Criticism of punitive damages is widespread.  The problem of suc-
cessive awards is a common complaint; for example, high punitive 
damages awards may bankrupt defendants before successive plaintiffs 
have the opportunity to get full compensation.36  Furthermore, assume 
a very high punitive damages award is calculated on the basis of a low 
detection rate.  Publicity over this high award may incite more plain-
tiffs to bring suit, and successful punitive damages claims in those suits 
will force the defendants to overpay for their harmful conduct.37  Of 
course, overdeterrence of harmful conduct may not be the most in-
stinctively troublesome aspect of punitive damages.  However, this issue 
is particularly salient when large punitive damages awards in products 
liability cases force companies that produce valuable products to close 
down or to take those products off the market.38  Claims for punitive 
damages may also lead to broader discovery, making it easier for plain-
 
35 See id. at 247, 603 (explaining the difference between social utility functions that 
do and do not count the utility gained from acquiescence to moral norms).  Note that 
these two justifications (underdetection and reprehensibility) may both be present in 
some cases.  For example, people commit many intentional torts, like conversion, sole-
ly because the tortfeasor seeks to avoid compensating the victim.  These crimes are re-
prehensible specifically because defendants commit them solely for the purposes of 
nondetection.  After all, if a defendant in a conversion suit knew that the detection 
rate was one hundred percent, there would be no incentive for the defendant not to 
pay the plaintiff full compensation for the property to begin with.  Thus, in this class of 
torts, the reprehensibility and detection theories for punitive damages converge.  See 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 160 (arguing that “theft and robbery and the like 
are wrongful” only because market transactions are feasible). 
36 See James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages:  A Relic That Has Out-
lived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1155 (1984) (discussing bankruptcies that re-
sulted from asbestos litigation). 
37 See John D. Long, Punitive Damages:  An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 
870, 887 (1976) (describing the problem of punitive damages in relation to mass-
disaster torts). 
38 See Victor E. Schwarz, Mark A. Behrens & Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Reining in 
Punitive Damages “Run Wild”:  Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1003, 1010-11 (1999) (documenting how punitive damages–liability concerns 
forced the antinausea drug Bendectin off the market). 
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tiffs with borderline-frivolous claims to press defendants into settlement 
to avoid heavy pretrial costs.39  Varieties on these themes are prevalent. 
The variability of punitive damages awards is another significant 
concern.  A 1996 study of punitive damages stressed the difference be-
tween mean and median punitive damages awards.40  In the study, the 
median punitive damages award was $50,000, but the mean award 
reached $859,006; this outcome suggests many relatively small awards, 
but also a substantial number of very large awards.41  Specifically, fif-
teen percent of punitive damages awards exceeded three times the 
value of corresponding compensatory damages.42  One seminal study 
showed a reassuring correlation between compensatory and punitive 
damages awards but acknowledged that “the possible range of punitive 
awards is . . . broad”—for a compensatory damages award of $500,000, 
five percent of related punitive damages awards were less than $10,000, 
while five percent were greater than $6.5 million.43  Furthermore, stu-
dies show broad agreement that punitive damages awards vary widely 
based on the jurisdiction in which they are awarded.44 
The recent growth of the field of behavioral law and economics 
has added new arguments against punitive damages.  Professors Suns-
tein, Kahneman, and Schkade have documented the phenomenon of 
wildly divergent punitive damages awards.45  They began one study by 
noting the excessiveness of some punitive damages awards, including 
the $4 million award in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore for a dealer’s 
failure to disclose that a car sold as “new” had been repainted.46  Addi-
tionally, they observed that median punitive damages verdicts ranged 
 
39 See Sales & Cole, supra note 37, at 1157-58 (“[T]he defendant must choose be-
tween the Scylla of economically devastating discovery costs . . . and the Charybdis of 
outrageous and unwarranted monetary settlements.”). 
40 Brian J. Ostrom, David B. Rottman & John A. Goerdt, A Step Above Anecdote:  A 
Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 237 (1996). 
41 Id. at 239 & fig.11. 
42 Id. at 240 fig.12. 
43 Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 623, 657 (1997). 
44 See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages:  Current Data and Further 
Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 33 (“Every empirical study on trends of punitive damages 
finds substantial variation within and between jurisdictions.”). 
45 Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages 
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).  A version of 
this paper is reproduced as a chapter in a later book, see SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 
17, at 31-42. 
46 Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 45, at 2075-76 (citing BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 619, 622 (Ala. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996)). 
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from under $10,000 in some counties to over $200,000 in others.47  
The authors therefore sought to determine, through psychological 
experiments, the source of this variation.  Their conclusions centered 
on individuals’ inability to convert gut feelings of reprehensibility into 
dollar amounts.48 
Participants in the study had a surprisingly high rate of agreement 
on the reprehensibility of various types of tortious conduct, signifying 
that jurors are capable of agreeing on the outrageousness of a defen-
dant’s actions.49  Where jurors failed was in translating that level of 
outrage into a dollar value.  In the study, “[t]he variability of individu-
al dollar judgments [was] so large that even the medians of the judg-
ments of twelve-member juries [were] quite unstable.”50  As a result, 
the authors proposed to allow jurors to act in their area of expertise—
determining the level of outrage, preferably on a bounded scale51—
and letting some governmental actor (for example, the judge or an 
administrative agency) convert that level of outrage to a dollar 
amount.  The effect would be to link dollar awards directly to outrage, 
which is a much less variable determination.52 
In a companion study, the authors attempted to determine what 
causes juries to produce such variable awards.53  The authors devised 
another psychological experiment to replicate the deliberation expe-
rience in order to identify problematic factors.54  One such factor is 
“polarization,” a phenomenon in which a discussion between individ-
 
47 Id. at 2076.   
48 Id. at 2097-99. 
49 See id. at 2097-98 (“Judgments of intent to punish in these personal injury scena-
rios evidently rest on a bedrock of moral intuitions that are broadly shared in society.”). 
50 Id. at 2103. 
51 The lack of a modulus (i.e., an upper bound to permissible awards) was another 
relevant factor in the Sunstein study, because decisionmaking will inevitably be more 
variable in the absence of a modulus.  See id. at 2106-07 (describing the lack of a mod-
ulus as “[t]he [u]nderlying [p]roblem”). 
52 Id. at 2109-25.  Note that jurors’ difficulty in determining a dollar value is not 
confined to punitive damages:  other studies demonstrate that jurors have similar prob-
lems converting shared perceptions of the severity of a nonpecuniary injury into a dollar 
value for compensatory awards.  See Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General 
Damages:  A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 794 (1999) 
(noting that “jurors have essentially no experience assigning a dollar value to injuries”). 
53 David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Are Juries Less Erratic 
than Individuals?  Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages (Univ. of Chi. Law 
Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 81, 1999) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=177638.  A version of this paper is reproduced as a chapter 
in a book by the same authors.  See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 43-61. 
54 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 44-46.  
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uals with moderately favorable views on a subject tends to produce 
more heavily favorable views in that group.55  Another issue is “severity 
shifts”—that is, the tendency for deliberations to trend toward one ex-
treme or the other.56  A jury moderately inclined to impose a penalty 
may find itself imposing a substantially harsher penalty after delibera-
tion—a harsher penalty than any individual juror would have recom-
mended prior to deliberation.57  In response, the authors discussed 
the suggestions made in the original article and additionally noted the 
possibility of dispensing with the jury entirely.58 
Other factors make the determination of a correct punitive dam-
ages value difficult for juries.  Some researchers suggest that juries 
remember jury instructions poorly and thus may not strictly follow 
judges’ dictates.59  The lack of an “anchor” besides the plaintiff’s re-
quested award—in other words, the absence of an idea of the average 
award in similar cases—puts jurors at sea in trying to estimate appro-
priate punitive damages.60  Along similar lines, an individual juror’s 
conception about whether plaintiffs in general are under- or over-
compensated may be “the most powerful predictor” of the size of the 
award that the individual juror supports.61  These problems, when 
combined, ensure that jury calculations of punitive damages are often 
very difficult, if not arbitrary, decisions. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S PUNITIVE DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court has attempted to curb excessively harsh puni-
tive damages awards in recent years, beginning primarily with BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore.62  In BMW, Ira Gore purchased a purported-
 
55 Id. at 57-58. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 61 (“[D]eliberating juries produce more unpredictability than would 
be found by taking the median of pre-deliberation judgments from jurors.”). 
58 See Schkade, Sunstein & Kahneman, supra note 53, at 35-37 (suggesting reforms 
based on the study’s results). 
59 See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages:  Empirical Insights 
and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 144-46 (2002) (discussing studies Reid 
Hastie conducted that showed juries’ difficulty in recalling instructions). 
60 See Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 45, at 2109-10 (finding that 
anchors can play an important role in the determination of jury awards).  Note the in-
tuitive observation that, if the plaintiff’s requested award does serve as an anchor, 
plaintiffs will have a strong incentive to increase that request. 
61 Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages:  
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 309 (1998). 
62 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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ly new car from a BMW dealership.63  Upon discovering that the car 
had been repainted, Gore sued the distributor.64  At trial, BMW admit-
ted that it typically repainted new cars that suffered minor damage in 
transit.65  Gore proved actual damages of $4,000—the diminution in 
value of the car as a result of the damage and repainting.66  He then 
argued that, given an estimate of 1,000 cars repainted and sold 
throughout the United States, punitive damages of $4 million were 
appropriate.67  The jury obliged, assessing $4,000 in compensatory 
damages and $4 million in punitive damages.68 
The Court determined that this award violated the substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69  
It began by noting that states can only legitimately “punish” plaintiffs by 
imposing damages corresponding to the harm committed within the 
state itself, and thus the 1,000-car multiplier was suspect.70  More impor-
tantly, the Court provided three “guideposts” to be used in determining 
whether an award is so “grossly excessive” as to violate the Constitution:  
(1) the degree of reprehensibility (in the Court’s view, the most impor-
tant factor); (2) the disparity between the harm suffered and the puni-
tive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive dam-
ages award and state-authorized civil or criminal penalties.71  The Court 
then applied each factor to the facts of the case.  It noted that the eco-
nomic harm in this case was not terribly reprehensible, despite its re-
peated occurrence.72  As to the second factor, the 500:1 ratio between 
the remitted punitive damages and compensatory damages well ex-
ceeded the 10:1 ratio that functions as a maximum “[i]n most cases.”73  
Finally, relevant civil-fraud penalties in this case would not have ex-
 
63 Id. at 563. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 563-64. 
66 Id. at 564. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 565. 
69 Id. at 585-86. 
70 Id. at 572.  The Alabama Supreme Court remitted the award to $2 million in 
punitive damages based in part on these concerns.  See id. at 567, 573-74 (explaining 
that the Alabama Supreme Court “based its remitted award solely on conduct that oc-
curred within Alabama”). 
71 Id. at 574-85. 
72 See id. at 575-80 (“[T]his case exhibits none of the circumstances ordinarily as-
sociated with egregiously improper conduct . . . .”). 
73 Id. at 581, 583. 
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ceeded $2,000.74  For these reasons, the Court held that Gore’s punitive 
damages award “transcend[ed] the constitutional limit.”75 
The Court further expounded on its guideposts in State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.76  In State Farm, Campbell had 
driven the wrong way on a highway and caused Todd Ospital to 
crash.77  Ospital’s family brought a wrongful death and tort action, and 
Campbell’s insurance company, State Farm, refused to settle Camp-
bell’s liability for $50,000, despite evidence that Campbell was at fault.78  
A jury determined Campbell was at fault and returned a judgment for 
$185,849.79  State Farm refused to cover this judgment, despite having 
told Campbell prior to trial that his “assets were safe.”80  Campbell sub-
sequently initiated a bad-faith action against State Farm (ninety per-
cent of the proceeds of which would go to Ospital, in consideration of 
Ospital’s decision not to execute the original verdict).81  The state su-
preme court upheld the judge’s reduced $1 million compensatory 
damage award for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and the jury’s original $145 million award of punitive damages.82 
As to the first “guidepost,” the Court acknowledged that State 
Farm’s actions “merit[ed] no praise.”83  However, the trial court’s 
award appeared to take into account State Farm’s pattern of conduct 
nationwide, including fraudulent conduct of a different character than 
that presented in the case.84  Retribution for such a broad range of 
conduct is impermissible under BMW, and thus the Court held that 
State Farm’s conduct was less reprehensible than the trial court’s pre-
sumption.85  Furthermore, the Court underscored the notion that 
 
74 See id. at 584 (describing the maximum civil penalty the relevant Alabama sta-
tute authorized). 
75 Id. at 586. 
76 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
77 Id. at 412-13. 
78 Id. at 413. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001)). 
81 Id. at 413-14. 
82 Id. at 415.  The trial court judge had reduced the jury’s award from $2.6 million 
in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages to $1 million in com-
pensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.  Id.  The state supreme court 
affirmed the judge’s reduced compensatory damage award but reinstated the jury’s 
$145 million punitive damage award.  Id. 
83 Id. at 419. 
84 Id. at 420. 
85 Id. at 424. 
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“[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process” 
than are larger multipliers.86  Thus, the Court had “no doubt that there 
is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio.”87  Finally, 
the corresponding civil penalty was only $10,000.  Thus, the Court re-
manded for calculation of a new punitive damages award.88 
Another case of note is Philip Morris USA v. Williams,89 in which the 
Court discussed the ways in which juries, in assessing punitive damag-
es, may take into account harm that the defendant has caused to non-
parties.  In Philip Morris, Williams, the widow of a cigarette smoker, 
sued the tobacco company for negligence and deceit.90  On appeal, 
Philip Morris challenged the rejection of its proposed jury instructions, 
which would have directed the jury to disregard Williams’s suggestion 
that the jury should punish Philip Morris for the widespread harm cig-
arettes caused in the state.91  The Supreme Court agreed, determining 
that those arguments affronted procedural due process by denying the 
defendant the opportunity to raise defenses as to the allegedly harmed 
nonparties.92  However, the Court accepted that juries could consider 
actual harm to nonparties in determining the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, since conduct that risks harm to more people 
tends to be more reprehensible.93  Thus, judges must make clear to ju-
ries that they cannot punish defendants for harm to nonparties but 
can consider harm to nonparties in assessing reprehensibility.94 
BMW and its progeny have produced a variety of criticisms from 
the bench.  Justice Scalia’s dissent in BMW argued that “the Constitu-
tion does not make [excessive punitive damages awards] any of our 
business,”95 and further that the Court’s rationale would apply to 
claims of excessiveness with respect to any civil remedy—“a stupefying 
proposition.”96  In short, Justice Scalia sees as unprincipled the idea 
that the Fourteenth Amendment has any bearing on the extent to 
which a state can impose punitive damages.  Taking a more muted 
tone, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in BMW expressed concerns regarding 
 
86 Id. at 425. 
87 Id. at 426. 
88 Id. at 428-29. 
89 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
90 Id. at 349. 
91 Id. at 350-51. 
92 Id. at 353-54. 
93 Id. at 355. 
94 Id. 
95 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
96 Id. at 607.  
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the Court’s invasion into state prerogatives (a nod to federalism suffi-
cient to convince Chief Justice Rehnquist to sign onto her dissent).97  
Justice Ginsburg stressed the extent to which states have capped puni-
tive damages awards in some or all cases; have allocated a fraction of 
punitive damages awards to benefit state agencies, rather than the 
plaintiff; and have bifurcated the liability and penalty proceedings.98  
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court’s ruling at its core required the 
Court to venture into “territory traditionally within the States’ do-
main,” even though “the Court is not well equipped for this mission.”99 
This jurisprudence (Philip Morris excepted) has centered on the 
supposition that the excessiveness of punitive damages awards impli-
cates substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
However, some support still exists in the Court for the proposition 
that the award of punitive damages generally implicates procedural due 
process.  The Court repudiated a claim along these lines in Pacific Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.100  That case, decided prior to BMW, 
involved punitive damages under Alabama’s common law.101  The jury 
instructions stated that the jury could impose punitive damages at its 
discretion to punish the defendant and deter other potential tortfea-
sors.102  According to the Court, “unlimited jury discretion . . . in the 
fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one’s 
constitutional sensibilities.”103  However, the Court determined that the 
jury instructions, by focusing the jury’s attention on deterrence and re-
tribution, provided sufficient guidance against arbitrary conduct.104 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, expressed 
the contrary view in his concurrence in BMW.  Justice Breyer began 
his BMW concurrence by noting that procedural due process assures 
“the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that is 
the essence of law itself.”105  This guarantee requires standards that 
“offer some kind of constraint upon a jury or court’s discretion, and 
thus protection against purely arbitrary behavior.”106  Breyer’s concern 
 
97 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
98 See id. app. at 615-19 (providing a comprehensive appendix of such state laws). 
99 Id. at 612-13. 
100 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
101 Id. at 14. 
102 Id. at 6 n.1. 
103 Id. at 18. 
104 Id. at 20. 
105 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
106 Id. at 588. 
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was that the Alabama Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Alabama 
punitive damages statute did not, in fact, constrain the jury’s discre-
tion.107  The Alabama Supreme Court’s doctrine did not distinguish 
between conduct warranting large or small damages,108 did not illu-
strate what a “reasonable” relationship to compensatory damages 
might be,109 allowed for unprincipled increases of awards based on the 
defendant’s wealth,110 and was not tied to any economic theory or 
community understanding.111  As a result, the award was “the product 
of a system of standards that did not significantly constrain a court’s, 
and hence a jury’s, discretion in making that award.”112  In the absence 
of standards that provide jury guidance, there is “a substantial risk of 
outcomes so arbitrary that they become difficult to square with the 
Constitution’s assurance, to every citizen, of the law’s protection.”113  
Thus, Justice Breyer found himself disagreeing with the rationale of 
the Court in Haslip and concluding that the purported “guidance” 
that juries receive is purely illusory.114 
The core question in the procedural due process analysis is 
whether the standards given to the jury are detailed enough to pre-
vent arbitrary decisionmaking (as opposed to the substantive due 
process analysis, which could conceivably hold unconstitutional a 
nonarbitrary yet excessive jury verdict).115  This appears to be the sort 
 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 589. 
110 Id. at 591. 
111 Id. at 593-94. 
112 Id. at 595. 
113 Id. at 596. 
114 Id. at 588 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).  
Note that in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), 
the Court’s majority acknowledged concerns about deficient jury instructions.  Al-
though the Court firmly based its holding on the excessiveness of the award, it noted 
that “[v]ague [jury] instructions . . . do little to aid the decisionmaker in its task of as-
signing appropriate weight to evidence that is relevant and evidence that is tangential 
or only inflammatory.”  538 U.S. at 418.  The Court cited both Justice Breyer’s concur-
ring opinion in BMW and Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in TXO Production 
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993)—opinions that stress procedural 
concerns regarding the imposition of punitive damages.  538 U.S. at 416-18.  TXO 
upheld a $10 million punitive damages award that corresponded to a $19,000 compen-
satory damages award.  509 U.S. at 446, 466.  Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice White 
and in relevant part by Justice Souter, surmised that the disproportionate award was 
not the product of reasoned discretion, but of impermissible bias against a wealthy, 
out-of-state firm.  Id. at 486-95 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor also ar-
gued that the state denied the defendant adequate postverdict review.  Id. at 495-500. 
115 BMW, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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of question that one might answer empirically.  Thus, one way to de-
termine whether jury decisionmaking is unconstitutionally arbitrary 
would be simply to analyze the data on punitive damages in an at-
tempt to determine whether juries award overly erratic punitive dam-
ages.  If the data show that juries are imposing punitive damages with 
little variability, then the majority in Haslip was most likely correct:  
there is no constitutional concern regarding how juries reach those 
decisions.  However, if the data show that juries are in fact imposing 
punitive damages capriciously, then Justice Breyer is most likely cor-
rect:  current punitive damages statutes do not provide sufficient 
guidance to juries.  As noted in Part I, recent studies suggest the latter 
by explaining the psychological barriers to principled jury decision-
making.  If such evidence continues to mount, defendants may find 
themselves positioned to convince the Court to reexamine the conclu-
sion it reached in Haslip.116 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
ARBITRARINESS JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Furman v. Georgia and Its Aftermath 
 
There is another area of law in which the risk of arbitrary out-
comes became impossible to square with the Constitution’s assurances 
of due process—the death penalty.  In 1972, the Supreme Court 
struck down Georgia’s death penalty regime—and, by implication, 
similar regimes in other states—in Furman v. Georgia.117  It did so 
through a brief, one-paragraph per curiam opinion, providing no ex-
 
116 Of note is one of the Court’s most recent cases on punitive damages, Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).  In that case, the Court, acting as a com-
mon law court under its maritime jurisdiction, determined that punitive damages 
could not exceed compensatory damages in maritime cases.  Id. at 2634.  The Court in 
Exxon noted its awareness of “a body of literature . . . examining the predictability of 
punitive awards,” including Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade’s article, Assessing Puni-
tive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law).  Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626 
n.17 (citing Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 45).  However, since “this re-
search was funded in part by Exxon,” the Court declined to consider it.  Id.  Presuma-
bly, the Court would be willing to consider this body of literature in a case featuring a 
different defendant.   
 The Court also considered a punitive damages award under maritime jurisdiction 
in Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009).  There, the Court de-
scribed the “general rule that punitive damages [that] were available at common law 
extended to claims arising under federal maritime law.”  Id. at 2567. 
117 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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planation for its decision.118  Five Justices filed concurrences; Justices 
Brennan and Marshall did so on the grounds that the death penalty 
per se violated norms of decency enshrined in the Eighth Amend-
ment.119  However, the case’s more narrow holding is that Georgia’s 
capital punishment regime was unconstitutionally arbitrary.120 
This view is expressed most clearly in an oft-quoted passage from 
Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion: 
 [The petitioners’] death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same 
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.  For, of all the 
people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as 
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected 
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been im-
posed. . . . I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal 




Similarly, Justice White argued that death penalty statutes provide 
“no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the 
death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”122  
In subsequent cases, the Court would take these two Justices’ opi-
nions as controlling.123 
A flurry of legislation and litigation followed.  States attempted to 
cure the constitutional defects in their capital punishment regimes by 
passing new statutes, while prisoners challenged their validity.124  A new 
 
118 Id. at 239-40. 
119 See id. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is truly an awesome punish-
ment.”); id. at 305 (arguing that death is per se cruel and unusual); id. at 370-71 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (same). 
120 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(“[T]he holding of the Court [in Furman] may be viewed as that position taken 
by . . . MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE.”); Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme 
Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 288 (2008) (observing that the Justices 
in Furman thought the death penalty “was too arbitrary in its application to pass consti-
tutional muster”). 
121 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
122 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
123 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 120; Paul Litton, The “Abuse Excuse” in Capital 
Sentencing Trials:  Is It Relevant to Responsibility, Punishment, or Neither?, 42 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1027, 1040-41 (2005) (“The opinions of Justices Stewart and White represent the 
holding of Furman, according to the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence.”). 
124 See Smith, supra note 120, at 289, 290 & n.20 (“Faced with what they took to be 
an unjustified assault on their prerogatives, legislatures quickly revised their death pe-
nalty statutes to satisfy the new constitutional mandates.”). 
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model for a death penalty statute soon emerged in Gregg v. Georgia.125  
Georgia’s revised statutory scheme listed six categories of crimes for 
which capital punishment could be imposed.  Capital trials were bifur-
cated:  the first part was a straightforward guilt-or-innocence determi-
nation, and in the second part, the jury heard evidence with regard to 
aggravating factors from the prosecution and mitigating factors from 
the defendant.  The jury then had to find the existence of one of ten 
statutorily designated aggravating factors and had to consider the ef-
fect of mitigating factors before imposing the death sentence.126 
Because these procedures channeled the jury’s discretion and fo-
cused its attention on the particular circumstances of the individual 
defendant, the Court was convinced that the new statute cured the ar-
bitrariness concerns discussed in Furman.  Under this statute, “[n]o 
longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence”; 
rather, the jury “is always circumscribed by the legislative guide-
lines.”127  Theoretically, this statute would limit the number of defen-
dants who would qualify for death penalty, and would help guide the 
jury’s process in deciding which defendants would receive the pu-
nishment.  These advantages would ensure that juries imposed the 
death penalty in a principled fashion.128  The statute thus comported 
with the Eighth Amendment.129 
Following its decision in Gregg, the Supreme Court has listed oth-
er procedural requirements for capital sentencing decisions.130  Fur-
thermore, the Court’s attention recently has focused on the substan-
tive question of when the Eighth Amendment categorically bars the 
death penalty.131  However, the basic structure of Furman and Gregg 
remains today. 
 
125 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
126 Id. at 162-66.  The statute also provided for expedited appellate review.  Id. at 
166. 
127 Id. at 206-07. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 207. 
130 See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (deciding that a jury, not a 
judge, must find the existence of the aggravating factors necessary to impose a death sen-
tence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (plurality opinion) (determining that 
the legislature cannot restrict a defendant from arguing relevant mitigating factors).  
131 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2664 (2008) (holding that im-
posing the death penalty for child rape violates the Eighth Amendment); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (holding that applying the death penalty to ju-
veniles violates the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) 
(holding that imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants violates the 
Eighth Amendment). 
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B.  Properly Understood, Furman Is a Procedural Due Process Decision 
Though couched in the language of the Eighth Amendment, Fur-
man v. Georgia is at heart a holding under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  This conclusion follows from the inter-
play between Furman and a case decided only one year earlier:  McGau-
tha v. California.132  In McGautha, two petitioners challenged their re-
spective states’ capital punishment procedures.133  For one petitioner, 
the jury instruction told jurors that they were “entirely free to act ac-
cording to [their] own judgment” in determining whether to impose 
death.134  For the second petitioner, the jury instructions merely told 
the jury that “the punishment is death, unless [they] recommend mer-
cy” and that they should deliberate with “impartiality.”135  Both peti-
tioners argued that the lack of standards governing the jury’s delibera-
tion violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 
The Court disagreed, finding no constitutional infirmity in the 
jury instructions at issue.137  Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, 
discussed the history of capital punishment.  He noted the early phe-
nomenon of jury nullification:  in the face of a mandatory death pe-
nalty for murderers, juries would refuse to convict when they thought 
death inappropriate.138  States facing this problem eliminated the 
mandatory character of the punishment, allowing juries to decide in 
their discretion whether to impose death.139  Thus, the history of the 
death penalty undermined the petitioners’ claim.  Furthermore, Jus-
tice Harlan expressed skepticism that a more detailed capital punish-
ment statute could reduce arbitrariness, characterizing various pro-
posals for jury instructions as granting only “the most minimal 
control” over the jury’s decisionmaking process.140  Because of the his-
tory of the punishment and the unlikelihood that judicial intervention 
would make a noticeable difference, the Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty procedures.141 
 
132 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
133 Id. at 185. 
134 Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135 Id. at 194-95 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136 Id. at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 199. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 207. 
141 Id. 
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That the Court in Furman would take issue with the arbitrariness 
of capital punishment—and that the Court in Gregg would character-
ize Georgia’s more detailed statute as curing that problem—is thus 
surprising.  Although McGautha was decided under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Furman and Gregg were de-
cided under the Eighth Amendment, one might still wonder whether 
Furman constructively overruled McGautha.  The dissenters in Furman 
took just such a view.  Chief Justice Burger, whose opinion the three 
other dissenters joined, wrote: 
 Although the Court’s decision in McGautha was technically confined 
to the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
rather than the Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the States 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would 
be disingenuous to suggest that today’s ruling has done anything less than 
overrule McGautha in the guise of an Eighth Amendment adjudication.
142
 
Similarly, Justice Powell, whose opinion the other three dissenters also 
joined, wrote: 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART . . . disposes of McGautha in a footnote reference 
indicating that it is not applicable because the question there arose un-
der the Due Process Clause.  MR. JUSTICE WHITE, who also finds the 
death penalty intolerable because of the process for its implementation, 
makes no attempt to distinguish McGautha’s clear holding.  For the rea-
sons expressed in the CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion, McGautha simply cannot 




Note that Justices White and Stewart were in the majority in McGautha 
and wrote the principal opinions in Furman.  As Justice Powell sug-
gested, there is little in their opinions in Furman that attempts to dis-
tinguish McGautha.  Even Justice Douglas, who concurred with the 
Court’s per curiam opinion in Furman, intimated that Furman and 
McGautha were irreconcilable.144 
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court explicitly addressed the tension be-
tween Furman and McGautha.  Justice Stewart, who authored a plurali-
ty opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, wrote: 
 In McGautha v. California, this Court held that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require that a jury [in a capital 
case] be provided with standards to guide its decision . . . . McGautha was 
not an Eighth Amendment decision, and to the extent it purported to 
 
142 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 400 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
143 Id. at 427 n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
144 Id. at 248 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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deal with Eighth Amendment concerns, it must be read in light of the 
opinions in Furman v. Georgia.  There the Court ruled that death sen-
tences imposed under statutes that left juries with untrammeled discre-
tion to impose or withhold the death penalty violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  While Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is 
clearly in substantial tension with a broad reading of McGautha’s hold-
ing.  In view of Furman, McGautha can be viewed rationally as a 
precedent only for the proposition that standardless jury sentencing 
procedures were not employed in the cases there before the Court so as 
to violate the Due Process Clause.
145
 
Although the Court said that Furman did not overrule McGautha, it did 
so through questionable logic.  The Court limits McGautha to the 
proposition that, for some unexplained reason, the death penalty sta-
tutes at issue in that case did not offend procedural due process—
while simultaneously conceding that Furman implies similar statutes 
might indeed offend that clause.  This confusion has led some scho-
lars to label Furman as a procedural due process case.146  At any rate, 
the Court’s equivocation about the relationship between Furman and 
McGautha certainly provides an argument that Furman has preceden-
tial value under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Eighth 
Amendment.  If so, Furman may apply to other types of arbitrary jury 
verdicts besides the death penalty—such as punitive damages. 
C.  Criticisms of the Court’s Death Penalty Regime 
Regardless of which amendment is doing the work, scholars se-
riously question whether post-Furman statutory changes have made 
capital punishment sentences less arbitrary.147  The very nature of the 
question makes it hard to answer conclusively, given the absence of 
quantitative data regarding the reprehensibility of capital crimes.  
Still, this has not dissuaded scholars from attempting to draw conclu-
 
145 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.47 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citations 
omitted). 
146 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death:  Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 319, 332 (1997) (characterizing Furman as a “Procedural Due Process” 
case arising under the Eighth Amendment); see also Lupe S. Salinas, Is It Time to Kill the 
Death Penalty?:  A View from the Bench and the Bar, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 49 n.60 (2006) 
(characterizing Furman as overruling McGautha). 
147 It is noteworthy that the American Law Institute, whose Model Penal Code 
death penalty statute laid the groundwork for post-Furman state statutes, has decided to 
abandon its death penalty project.  See Adam Liptak, Shapers of Death Penalty Give Up on 
Their Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at A11 (“[T]he institute voted . . . to disavow the 
structure it had created in light of the current intractable institutional and situational 
obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering capital punish-
ment.” (quoting the American Law Institute) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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sions about the effectiveness of the Gregg regime—the procedures that 
Georgia and other states added to capital sentencing proceedings—
using a variety of methodologies. 
David McCord argues that, pursuant to Furman, state death penal-
ty statutes must at least narrow the class of defendants upon whom the 
death penalty may be imposed.148  Under this view, successful death 
penalty statutes should cause juries to (1) reserve the death penalty 
for the worst offenders, (2) sentence those types of offenders to death 
at a robust rate, (3) generally impose capital punishment more often 
for crimes of greater reprehensibility, and (4) deviate from these 
guidelines only for rational reasons.149  McCord surveyed news reports 
of capital crimes to try to determine whether these goals are currently 
achieved.150  For each report, he attempted to quantify the number of 
“aggravating” factors in the description of the crime and the number 
of “mitigating” factors in the description of the crime and the crimi-
nal.151  Based on these factors, he gave each crime a total “depravity 
point” score.152  His study concluded that state statutes failed on all four 
goals, arguing, for example, that “[d]eath sentences were imposed on 
fewer than half . . . of the defendants who [committed murders] so ri-
diculously or enormously aggravated that it boggles the mind.”153 
Other academics question whether state statutes are at all success-
ful in narrowing the class of defendants eligible for capital punish-
ment.  One seminal study, led by David Baldus, compared the imposi-
tion of the death penalty in Georgia following Gregg with the 
imposition of the death penalty under Georgia’s pre-Furman statute.154  
The study found some improvements, namely, “a substantial reduction 
in the proportion of excessive death sentences” (i.e., fewer death sen-
 
148 David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes:  Evidence from the Popular Press That Death 
Sentencing Continues to Be Unconstitutionally Arbitrary More than Three Decades After Fur-
man, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 797 (2005). 
149 See id. at 808 (providing these four guidelines in question form). 
150 See id. at 800 (describing the search). 
151 Id. at 833. 
152 Id. at 833-40. 
153 Id. at 864.  McCord goes on to note that “[t]errorist bomber Terry Ni-
chols . . . was spared a death sentence by a jury, . . . yet Cory Maye, who . . . shot [a po-
lice officer] with a bullet that just missed hitting the officer’s bulletproof vest, was 
death-sentenced by a jury.”  Id. 
154 See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY:  A LEGAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1990) (“This book is a study of equal justice in death sen-
tencing during the fifteen-year period between two United States Supreme Court deci-
sions from Georgia, Furman v. Georgia (1972) and McCleskey v. Kemp (1987).”). 
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tences imposed in the “least aggravated cases”).155  However, “[e]ven 
when viewed in the most favorable light, only 50 percent to 60 percent 
of Georgia’s death-sentence cases appear[ed] to be presumptively 
evenhanded, and nearly a third of them [we]re presumptively exces-
sive.”156  Most importantly, “more than 90 percent of the pre-Furman 
death sentences were imposed in cases whose facts would have made 
them death-eligible under Georgia’s post-Furman statute.”157  So al-
though Georgia’s Gregg statute may have succeeded in eliminating cap-
ital punishment for the least culpable cases, it failed to single out suffi-
ciently the classes of capital defendants who are truly reprehensible.158 
Another study by Adam Gershowitz argues that the imposition of 
the death penalty varies widely across jurisdictions depending on the 
extent to which prosecuting attorneys are inclined to seek it.159  The 
Supreme Court focuses its jurisprudence on the sentencing segment 
of the trial and only attempts to reduce arbitrariness on the part of 
the jury.  Even if its jurisprudence succeeded in that regard, the Court 
“has failed to provide prosecutors with incentives or constraints to 
bring only the worst cases into the death-penalty system.”160  If prose-
cutors are free to seek the death penalty at their discretion, there is no 
procedural protection in place to ensure that prosecutors will not, for 
example, only seek the death penalty in the least culpable of cases—or 
that prosecutors will adhere to any standard in deciding for whom 
they will seek the death penalty.  This failing introduces an element of 
arbitrariness into capital proceedings independent of how well 
coached the jury is—and, most importantly, injects that arbitrariness 
into the proceeding whenever prosecutors in different regions of the 
same state approach the choice differently.161  As a result, Gershowitz’s 
 
155 Id. at 131. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 102. 
158 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:  Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 375 (1995) 
(explaining that the Baldus study “strongly suggests that Georgia has not articulated a 
carefully circumscribed theory of what the state might regard as the ‘worst’ murders”). 
159 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. 
73, 74-76 (2007) (“Prosecutors have incredibly wide discretion to choose which cases 
they will pursue, and their discretion is nearly as broad in determining whether to seek 
the death penalty.” (footnotes omitted)). 
160 Id. at 98. 
161 See id. at 95 (“The long-time district attorney for Philadelphia County . . . makes 
it a practice to seek the death penalty whenever it is available.  By contrast, the former 
district attorney of comparably sized Allegheny County (which includes Pittsburgh) 
rarely sought the death penalty during his tenure.”). 
BARON REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  12:20 PM 
2011] The “Monstrous Heresy” of Punitive Damages 877 
study argues that the Court should cap the number of cases in which a 
prosecutor may seek the death penalty.162 
For a long time, many have alleged racial disparities in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty.163  The seminal researcher in this area, the 
aforementioned David Baldus, conducted a variety of studies on the 
subject.  One such study of racial disparities served as the basis for an 
Equal Protection Clause and Eighth Amendment habeas corpus chal-
lenge to the death penalty that lost in the Supreme Court on a 5–4 
vote.164  One article that Baldus coauthored describes a General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) report on twenty-eight relevant examinations 
of the effect of race in death penalty cases.165  The GAO concluded 
that “[i]n 82 percent of the studies, [the] race of [the] victim was 
found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital mur-
der or receiving the death penalty.”166  The Baldus article then 
presents a statistical analysis of data derived from capital cases in Phil-
adelphia and concludes that “it would be extremely unlikely to ob-
serve [racial] disparities of both this magnitude and consistency if 
substantial equality existed in this system’s treatment of defendants.”167 
Of course, there is inherent difficulty in crafting objective, statis-
tical answers to the question of whether Gregg statutes work.  The de-
termination of whether a crime is heinous enough to warrant the 
death penalty is inherently subjective, as is the existence and effect of 
mitigating factors.  Determining, on the whole, whether the people 
 
162 Id. at 104.  
163 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death:  An Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 42-45 
(1984) (describing a variety of such racial-impact studies). 
164 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-91 (1987) (describing the Baldus 
study as “flawed”).  The petitioner in McCleskey relied heavily upon the Baldus study; 
the lower courts’ analyses focused on the validity of the study and, assuming its validity, 
its equal protection ramifications.  Id. at 283-91.  The majority argued that evidence of 
racial discrimination generally does not prove that the jury in the defendant’s specific 
case acted with discriminatory intent.  See id. at 294-95 (“[T]he application of an infe-
rence drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing 
simply is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn from general statis-
tics to a specific venire-selection . . . .”).  The dissent noted that, though this argument 
may appear correct for the Equal Protection Clause, it has no bearing on the Eighth 
Amendment analysis of arbitrary imposition.  See id. at 323-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[O]ur inquiry under the Eighth Amendment has not been directed to the validity of 
the individual sentences before us.”). 
165 David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era:  An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1659 (1998). 
166 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
167 Id. at 1715. 
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getting the death penalty are really of a separate class of reprehensibili-
ty is a tall task, though not an impossible one.  One possibility is to at-
tempt the sort of multiple-regression analysis done by Baldus, or by 
other studies purporting to show a racial bias in the imposition of the 
death penalty.168  Another would be an experiment like that done by 
Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade in Assessing Punitive Damages.169  A 
similar experiment could have a series of mock juries attempting to 
decide whether to impose the death penalty in hypothetical cases.  A 
control group would be asked to decide which punishment to inflict 
with no guidance (i.e., in its sole discretion), based on the facts pre-
sented.  Another group would be asked to do the same, but subject to 
statutory schemes in place today.  Information about the facts would be 
presented, as would “arguments” by the prosecution and the defense 
about whether the death penalty should be imposed (fake videos could 
even be filmed).  The results of such a study would be illuminating.170 
IV.  APPLYING FURMAN TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A.  The Requirements of Furman Should Apply to Punitive Damages 
 
The issue of whether the death penalty is being inflicted arbitrari-
ly is, on its face, similar to the issue of whether punitive damages are 
imposed arbitrarily.171  Scholars of punitive damages should thus con-
 
168 See Gross & Mauro, supra note 163, at 42-45 (listing various racial impact studies). 
169 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. 
170 A similar study could also be conducted for the jury instructions that Part V ul-
timately proposes.  A control group could be presented with a test case and allowed to 
set punitive damages in its sole discretion.  Another group would then be presented 
with the same test case and be allowed to set punitive damages subject to the instruc-
tions proposed in this Comment.  The results may show whether the instructions re-
duce variability between juries and would indicate whether states should seriously con-
sider these proposed reforms. 
171 This comparison was made in Bernard W. Bell, Byron R. White, Kennedy Justice, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1418 n.294 (1999) (book review), which linked Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent in TXO to Justice White’s concurrence in Furman with a “see also” 
signal; briefly in Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries:  
Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 
1315 (1996), which discussed Furman as a precursor to BMW in terms of distrust of ju-
ries; in an examination of the ramifications of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker in Jeffrey L. 
Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5-6 
(2009); in an argument for enhanced appellate review of punitive damages in Stephan 
Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 903 (2002); briefly in 
Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 45, at 2091, which observed that “Justice 
Breyer’s opinion can be understood as connecting the outcome in BMW with . . . the 
constitutional attack on the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia”; and in Penny J. White, 
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sider whether Furman and Gregg provide a blueprint for how the Court 
might respond to a procedural challenge to punitive damages and for 
how the states would likely react.  The first question is whether and to 
what extent the requirements of Furman and Gregg bind the states with 
respect to their punitive damages statutes.  Under current 
precedent—namely Haslip—the imposition of punitive damages does 
not implicate due process.  Admittedly, any bet that the Court is 
poised to overrule Haslip (even if only constructively) and, further, to 
apply Furman’s requirements to punitive damages faces long odds.  
Regardless, the following Section presents an argument that Four-
teenth Amendment procedural due process may indeed require 
greater regularity in punitive damages awards. 
First, recall the discussion in Section III.B of the interplay between 
McGautha and Furman.  McGautha held that untrammeled juror dis-
cretion did not offend procedural due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, while Furman held that untrammeled juror discretion 
did offend the Eighth Amendment.  A majority of the Court in Furman 
acknowledged that Furman constructively overruled McGautha.172  
Meanwhile, the Court in Gregg stopped just short of admitting as 
much, attempting to limit the holding of McGautha in an unconvinc-
ing fashion.  Thus, one could rationally conclude that Furman does in 
fact overrule McGautha.  This determination would imply that Furman 
is valid precedent for both the Eighth Amendment and procedural 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  And if this is the 
case, then Furman may apply to other types of verdicts that juries are 
imposing arbitrarily.  Thus, if punitive damages face this arbitrariness 
problem, they are unconstitutional under Furman. 
Even if one hesitates to characterize Furman as a procedural due 
process holding, the Court could still validly treat Furman as persuasive 
authority in the procedural due process context.  Such an argument 
proceeds as follows.  A state is required under Furman and Gregg at 
least to narrow the class of defendants upon whom the death penalty 
can be imposed,173 because the Eighth Amendment prevents the arbi-
 
Can Lightning Strike Twice?:  Obligations of State Courts After Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 813, 856-59 (1999), which noted that Justice O’Connor’s dissent in TXO ex-
presses similar themes to Justice Breyer’s concurrence in BMW and argued that similar 
values apply in the death penalty context.  The author is unaware of other articles mak-
ing this comparison. 
172 This majority is comprised of the four dissenting Justices, plus Justice Douglas.  
See supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text. 
173 The Supreme Court appears to have backed away from the requirement that 
capital punishment statutes channel the jury’s discretion, or at least it appears to have 
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trary imposition of capital punishment.  Under controlling doctrine, 
capital punishment is “cruel and unusual” if individuals have no way 
of telling why one criminal defendant receives that punishment, while 
another criminal defendant on trial in a substantially similar case rece-
ives life in prison.  Defendants must not be subject to “wanton[] 
and . . . freakish[]”174 imposition of this ultimate punishment; rather, 
state law must signal to the jury the factors that can make a capital de-
fendant’s particular offense of sufficient reprehensibility to warrant 
the death penalty. 
Meanwhile, the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary govern-
ment action.  The dictates of procedural due process ensure that indi-
viduals are protected from “‘the arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
government.’”175  The requirement that government “follow appropri-
ate procedures . . . promotes fairness.”176  As a result, in criminal and 
civil cases, the jury’s discretion must be guided “within reasonable 
constraints” to satisfy due process—otherwise, the jury’s unbridled 
discretion risks arbitrary, irrational results.177  Along these lines, “un-
limited jury discretion . . . in the fixing of punitive damages may invite 
extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.”178  Whether 
the instructions currently given to jurors provide adequate guidance is 
inherently a matter of judgment, and, as discussed, the Court has 
ruled that at least one state’s punitive damages regime provided that 
requisite guidance.179  However, as argued in Part II, current (or fu-
ture) studies may demonstrate that punitive damages are in fact being 
imposed arbitrarily. 
If studies demonstrate this arbitrariness, then a constitutional 
problem is raised; this problem is inescapably similar to that addressed 
in Furman and Gregg.  Furman’s concern about the “wanton[] 
and . . . freakish[]”180 imposition of the death penalty mirrors current 
 
conflated this requirement as coextensive with the narrowing requirement.  See Steiker 
& Steiker, supra note 158, at 380-82 (explaining “[t]he collapsing of the channeling 
requirement into the narrowing function”). 
174 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
175 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)). 
176 Id. 
177 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991). 
178 Id. at 18. 
179 See id. at 20 (“These instructions . . . reasonably accommodated Pacific Mutual’s 
interest in rational decisionmaking and Alabama’s interest in meaningful individua-
lized assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution.”). 
180 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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concerns about the unguided imposition of punitive damages.  The 
Court in Gregg approved one way of curing the constitutional defects 
of legal procedures that produce arbitrary results—namely, using jury 
instructions that provide more guidance about the jury’s role.  This 
simplified answer, it seems, should apply equally to punitive damages.  
The problem of arbitrariness is the same, and it appears clear that 
more detailed jury instructions could resolve the problem in both 
areas.  Applying Eighth Amendment doctrine to punitive damages un-
der the broader dictates of procedural due process thus makes intui-
tive sense.  In addition, this application has the benefit of interpreting 
like constitutional provisions alike.  If the Eighth Amendment includes 
some sort of procedural component, it ought to provide protections 
similar to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.181  
The Court, if inclined to find that punitive damages are currently be-
ing applied in an impermissibly arbitrary fashion, could easily follow 
the path that Furman forged:  strike down existing statutes as unconsti-
tutional and wait for states to pass new ones with additional procedural 
protections.  These statutes could take a variety of forms but may mir-
ror Gregg statutes.  One would hope the statutes would provide the jury 
with better guidance. 
The observation that the Court’s rationale in Furman and Gregg 
may also be binding or persuasive authority in the punitive damages 
realm does more than merely suggest that jury guidance should be 
improved; it provides guidance to states about how exactly to accom-
plish this task.  Because the Court has found states’ efforts to minimize 
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty to be successful, states 
could use similar methods to reduce the arbitrary imposition of puni-
tive damages.  Furthermore, even if the Constitution does not require 
states to revamp their punitive damages statutes in accordance with 
Furman, this does not mean that enterprising states cannot consider the 
lessons of Furman while engaging in punitive damages reform.  Nota-
bly, if one believes that punitive damages are not variable to the point 
of caprice—and thus that Haslip retains force—one can still acknowl-
 
181 Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes an equal protection component).  The 
Court in Bolling argued that it would be “unthinkable” that the states’ and the federal 
government’s equal protection obligations could differ.  Id. at 500.  One might counter 
that this principle of constitutional coherence need not apply to clauses of fundamen-
tally different substance—in this case, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Pu-
nishments Clause, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses.  
However, if the Eighth Amendment incorporates some facet of procedural regularity, it 
would be anomalous for the Due Process Clause to offer less protection in this regard. 
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edge that state punitive damages reform could be useful.  Thus, states 
can and should use Gregg statutes as a model for a successful punitive 
damages statute, while taking into account the current criticisms of 
state death penalty sentencing procedures. 
B.  Furman Should Apply to Punitive Damages Regardless of  
Criticisms of the Case 
Given criticism of Furman, there is a question of whether, as a pol-
icy matter, modeling punitive damages statutes after Gregg statutes 
makes sense.  Section III.C is not a comprehensive survey of the litera-
ture skeptical of the Court’s efforts, but it attempts to illustrate the va-
riety of criticisms.  If there is such ample literature dispelling the effi-
cacy of Gregg statutes, one might not be inclined to impose such an 
inefficient system upon another area of the law.  However, these criti-
cisms should not dissuade the Court or state legislatures from consi-
dering Gregg’s applicability to punitive damages statutes.  Whether 
states have adequately responded to the concerns in Furman does not 
change the conceptual soundness of those concerns.  Thus, states 
seeking to reform punitive damages should take the lessons of Furman 
to heart and learn from the mistakes in the death penalty realm. 
First, as noted in Section III.C, potential reformers must be aware 
that empirical research is unlikely to indicate whether the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence has had its intended effect in the death penalty 
realm.  This is because of the difficulty of crafting a quantitative de-
scription of the heinousness of a specific capital crime.  However, were 
states to modify their punitive damages statutes, a wealth of data would 
become available with which to analyze the effect of the change.  For 
example, the new average and median punitive damages awards, the 
new range of punitive damages awards, and the new ratios between 
compensatory damages and punitive damages could all be studied.  If 
such studies indicated that these reforms had a real effect on the 
amount and variability of punitive damages, this would provide evi-
dence that the Court’s post-Furman rulings have succeeded in reducing 
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.  Thus, duplicating the 
Furman experiment in the punitive damages realm may lead to empiri-
cally valuable information on Furman’s efficacy in both contexts. 
Although many doubt the practical success of Furman, such skep-
ticism does not necessarily imply that its goals are invalid.  A main 
concern with states’ responses to Furman is that the new statutes are 
just as broad as pre-Furman ones.  Thus, the statutes fail to narrow suf-
ficiently the class of defendants to whom the death penalty can be ap-
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plied and are less in accord with Furman than the Court would like to 
think.  The core contribution to this problem is that states may have 
drafted lists of aggravating factors broad enough to apply to nearly any 
capital defendant.182  But though the states’ responses to Furman may 
have been unsuccessful at reducing arbitrariness in the imposition of 
the death penalty, the central idea of channeling juror discretion and 
narrowing the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty re-
mains a logical endeavor.  For example, imagine a state death penalty 
statute that had as its sole aggravating factor a past conviction for a 
capital crime.  Such a statute would seriously reduce the number of 
death penalty–eligible defendants and would limit the death penalty to 
a type of criminal categorically more culpable than most others.  Fur-
thermore, state statutes could guide juror deliberations in a more ro-
bust fashion—rather than merely telling jurors to weigh mitigating fac-
tors against aggravating factors, the statutes could suggest to the jurors 
how various factors might relate to or offset each other.  This sort of 
statute would better meet the constitutional goals laid out in Furman. 
Thus, although the Supreme Court may have failed in enforcing 
the constitutional requirements of the Eighth Amendment, this does 
not bear on the question of whether the requirements themselves are 
valid and whether they can or should carry over into other settings.  In 
fact, these requirements could translate well into the punitive damages 
realm.  States seeking to eliminate the arbitrariness of punitive dam-
ages statutes pursuant to these requirements would have two goals in 
mind.  First, new statutes should attempt to narrow the class of defen-
dants to whom punitive damages can be applied.  They should do so by 
delineating clearly the situations in which punitive damages make 
sense from an economic standpoint.  In this way, they would reduce 
the number of punitive damages awards and would ensure that such 
awards are given only in the most deserving of scenarios.  Second, 
these statutes should attempt to guide the jury’s deliberative process.  
They should do so by instructing the jury to reflect on factors relevant 
to the amount of punitive damages that is warranted in a given case.  
Such a hypothetical statute has the potential to reduce arbitrariness in 
the imposition of punitive damages by taking the Furman concerns se-
riously—untrammeled juror discretion in choosing the amount of pu-
 
182 See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 154, at 131 (noting that the “statutory aggravating 
circumstances do not provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing between the rela-
tively few defendants who are sentenced to death and the vast majority who receive life 
sentences or less”). 
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nitive damages and the possibility of punitive damages for every defen-
dant.  The question, then, is what such a statute would look like. 
C.  How the Procedural, Substantive, and Behavioral Criticisms of Punitive 
Damages Should Influence New Statutes 
This Comment recounts three important shortcomings of the cur-
rent punitive damages regime:  (1) the inability of jurors to translate 
consensus on reprehensibility into dollar amounts in Section I.B, (2) 
the substantive excessiveness of some awards in Part II, and (3) the 
lack of guidance that troubled the Court in Furman in Part III.  A state 
seeking to reform its statute—whether compelled by the Court in a 
Furman-esque decision or of its own accord—ought to take into ac-
count these criticisms.  The following is an example of how a state 
might do so.  It uses as a foundation the standard capital punishment 
statute, in order to satisfy the third criticism, and expands upon it in 
ways responsive to the first two criticisms. 
First, the state should bifurcate the jury’s role.  The proceedings 
would begin with a liability and compensatory phase, during which 
the jury would determine the existence of the elements of a tort claim 
and the proper amount of compensatory damages.183  Then, if a suc-
cessful plaintiff seeks punitive damages, the state should proceed with 
a punitive phase.  During this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiff 
and the defendant would argue for and against the imposition of puni-
tive damages.  The plaintiff would have a range of statutorily pre-
scribed aggravating factors to argue, while the defendant would have a 
range of statutorily prescribed mitigating factors to argue.184  A bifur-
cated proceeding is advantageous because it allows for the admission 
of evidence not strictly relevant to the issue of liability for compensato-
 
183 A number of states do indeed bifurcate the proceedings in punitive damage 
trials.  See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, app. at 618-19 (1996) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (listing states that use this approach); see also Schwartz, Behrens & Ma-
strosimone, supra note 38, at 1019 (listing legal organizations, including the American 
Bar Association, that support bifurcation). 
184 The Court’s decision not to limit the types of mitigating factors that a capital 
defendant can argue is rooted in the categorical difference between death and other 
punishments.  See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (recognizing that 
“the imposition of death by public authority is . . . profoundly different from all other 
penalties”).  That concern is not present in the punitive damages setting.  Thus, a legis-
lature could choose to limit the number of both mitigating and aggravating factors, of 
neither, or of one or the other.  This decision would depend on the extent to which a 
legislature wants to favor plaintiffs or defendants, as narrowing one class would work to 
that side’s detriment.  For the sake of explication and impartiality, this Comment as-
sumes that there are statutorily prescribed factors on both sides. 
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ry damages.185  Bifurcation is also helpful for focusing the jury’s atten-
tion solely on the imposition of punitive damages.186  Further, such a 
rule would mirror the protections that states have extended to capital 
defendants.  Following argument, the jury would retire to deliberate. 
The core of the jury’s deliberations would be a balancing of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors.  Like in the capital punishment realm, 
the jury should have to find the existence of at least one aggravating 
factor by clear and convincing evidence; this higher burden of proof 
better comports with the “quasi-criminal nature of punitive damag-
es.”187  These aggravating factors should be precise and limited, such 
that juries may not impose punitive damages in every tort case.188  Ex-
amples of aggravating factors germane to a decision to impose punitive 
damages could include:  (1) the defendant acted with intent and was 
motivated by a desire to cause harm; (2) the defendant has caused sim-
ilar types of harm in this state, and victims usually do not recover for 
those harms; (3) the defendant’s actions needlessly created a grave risk 
of serious bodily injury or death to a large number of people, and the 
defendant was aware of the risk; and (4) the defendant has been found 
liable in a similar tort case within the past three years, for which puni-
tive damages were not imposed.189  Legislatures seeking to narrow fur-
ther the class of defendants to whom punitive damages may apply 
could consider requiring a jury to find the existence of more than one 
aggravating factor before imposing punitive damages. 
If jurors found clear and convincing evidence that at least one ag-
gravating factor was present, they would then be instructed to consid-
er mitigating factors.  Each juror would have to consider independent-
ly whether or not the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
factors present and could only vote to impose punitive damages if she 
found that the aggravating factors did outweigh the mitigating factors.  
Imposition of punitive damages would require a unanimous vote by 
 
185 Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1976) (plurality opinion) (explaining 
the benefits of separate evidentiary standards in a bifurcated sentencing proceeding). 
186 See, e.g., Schwartz, Behrens & Mastrosimone, supra note 38, at 1018 (discussing 
the “compartmentaliz[ation]” effect on jurors’ ability to distinguish between the dif-
ferent burdens of proof for compensatory and punitive damages). 
187 Id. at 1013. 
188 As noted, some scholars worry that current capital murder statutes fail to 
achieve this limiting objective.  See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 154, at 131 (noting 
that the post-Furman Georgia statute lacked sufficient guidance for determining when 
to employ the death penalty). 
189 These factors would be subject, of course, to the dictates of Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams.  See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
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the jury.  Examples of possible mitigating factors include:  (1) the 
harm was caused by the defendant’s production of a product of signif-
icant importance to society; (2) the victim knowingly submitted to the 
harmful conduct (even though that submission does not defeat the 
defendant’s compensatory liability); (3) the defendant has provided, 
or has attempted to provide, remuneration to substantially all its vic-
tims; and (4) although negligent, the defendant made some attempts 
to mitigate or eliminate the risk of harm. 
The purpose of these aggravating and mitigating factors would be 
to limit the imposition of punitive damages to situations in which it is 
economically beneficial.  These include situations in which defen-
dants act tortiously because they gain utility from the act of causing 
harm itself (or because they otherwise act in a substantially reprehens-
ible fashion) and situations in which defendants will not be adequate-
ly deterred because of detection problems.  Punitive damages should 
not be awarded when compensatory damages will adequately deter 
conduct, when there are concerns of overdeterring beneficial con-
duct, and when the defendant’s conduct is not particularly reprehens-
ible.  These four aggravating and four mitigating factors attempt to 
channel the jury to impose punitive damages only when appropriate, 
though different factors and other constructions may prove more 
helpful to this end. 
These instructions would cure procedural defects in the jury’s de-
cision to impose punitive damages but would not necessarily guide the 
jury in its choice of a monetary amount.  References to the Supreme 
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence and to the behavioral law and 
economics literature may provide such guidance.  Jurors should thus 
be instructed that punitive damages that exceed compensatory dam-
ages by a factor of ten are usually unconstitutional.190  Thus, a jury 
should only impose punitive damages more than ten times greater 
than compensatory damages in the most reprehensible of cases—for 
example, if there are three or more aggravating factors and no mitigat-
ing factors present.  Furthermore, the jury should be instructed that 
comparable civil or criminal penalties should provide a baseline award 
amount.  (The defendant or the plaintiff would likely introduce evi-
dence of these penalties in the punitive damages hearing, depending 
on the size of the applicable fine.)  Finally, jurors should be provided 
with information about the average punitive damages award for the 
 
190 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (discussing cases in 
which courts upheld punitive damages awards ranging from four to ten times the 
compensatory damages). 
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causes of action presented (this information could be introduced in 
the punitive damages hearing as well). 
This instruction would conform to the Supreme Court’s relevant 
jurisprudence and mitigate the behavioral issues juries face in assess-
ing a monetary penalty.  As noted, Sunstein and others express con-
cern about the unbounded nature of the jury’s choice; the jury has 
neither an anchor (a suggested award) nor an upper limit on the 
damages award it can impose.191  This instruction would provide the 
jury with a lower bound to its award (zero), an upper bound to its 
award (ten times compensatory damages, except in the most egre-
gious of cases), and two potential anchors—the comparable civil or 
criminal penalties and the average punitive damages award.  The jury 
could choose either as its anchor, or it could average the numbers.  
The jury would then be directed to discuss the extent to which aggra-
vating factors outweigh mitigating factors.  Only if multiple aggravating 
factors completely dominated mitigating factors could a jury depart 
from the ten-times-compensatory-damages limit.  In all other cases, the 
jury should be instructed that the presence of mitigating factors should 
counsel a downward departure from the modulus, and the presence of 
multiple aggravating factors should counsel an upward departure from 
the modulus, staying within the prescribed limits. 
Other features of the jury instructions could attempt to cure re-
maining behavioral problems.  For example, Sunstein, Kahneman, and 
Schkade discuss how deliberation by itself can lead juries to tend to ex-
tremes and to choose larger awards than they otherwise might.192  The 
jury should thus be clearly instructed that in almost all cases, a ratio of 
less than 10:1 between punitive and compensatory damages will be ap-
propriate.  Judges should also instruct juries that the foreman’s role in 
ensuring a balanced debate between jurors in support of and in opposi-
tion to large punitive damages is paramount.  Finally, each juror should 
be instructed to take care to voice concerns when deliberations produce 
a punitive damages award substantially larger or substantially smaller 
than her initial impulse as to the correct amount.  Although curing the 
effects of deliberation is not easy, these instructions should help ensure 
that jurors are at least aware of the problem. 
 
191 See supra notes 53 and 60 and accompanying text. 
192 See Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 45, at 2101 (“No doubt group 
dynamics can push deliberations in unexpected directions, sometimes toward the most 
extreme member of the group.”). 
BARON REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  12:20 PM 
888 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 853 
V.  A PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 
Though not perfect, the following proposed instruction attempts to 
respond to the foregoing analysis.193  Though it is long, some suggest 
that brief and technically written jury instructions can be unhelpful;194 
having a judge present these instructions and explain them thoroughly 
may aid the jury’s ability to follow the instructions carefully. 
“Having found the defendant liable for compensatory damages, 
your task is now to determine whether to impose additional damages, 
called punitive damages, and if so, how much.  Punitive damages are 
designed to punish defendants for especially reprehensible conduct 
and to deter defendants who commit tortious acts frequently and who 
are infrequently prosecuted.  When one or both of these conditions is 
present, punitive damages are appropriate. 
“You have just heard evidence from the plaintiff and the defen-
dant as to the propriety of punitive damages in this case.  Using this 
evidence, you must first determine whether to impose punitive dam-
ages at all.  To do so, you must find clear and convincing evidence of 
at least one of the following aggravating factors: 
“(1) The defendant acted with intent and was motivated by a de-
sire to harm the victim. 
“(2) The defendant has caused similar types of harm to victims in 
this state, and those victims infrequently recover for the harm they 
suffer. 
“(3) The defendant’s actions needlessly created a grave risk of se-
rious bodily injury or death to a large number of people, and the de-
fendant was aware of the risk.  This usually occurs when a defendant 
was aware of very inexpensive safety precautions that would avoid a 
very likely and very severe harm, and the defendant did not take those 
precautions.  However, if a defendant does not take expensive safety 
precautions that would avoid an unlikely or relatively small harm, this 
aggravating factor is not present. 
“(4) The defendant has been found liable in a tort case within the 
past three years, for which punitive damages were not imposed. 
 
193 Other authors have similarly suggested model jury instructions for punitive 
damages.  See, e.g., Jacqueline Perczek, Note, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence, and 
Fairness:  A Survey of Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 825, 868-73 (1993). 
194 See Robbennolt, supra note 59, at 185-86 (discussing problems that arise when 
juries do not receive adequate guidance).  But see id. at 144-46 (noting problems with 
lengthy instructions). 
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“If you find the existence of one of these factors, you must move 
on to consider mitigating factors.  Each juror must independently de-
termine whether any mitigating factors are present.  Each juror must 
then weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors.  On-
ly if each juror determines that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating factors can you impose any punitive damages.  The mitigat-
ing factors are as follows: 
“(1) The harm caused was the byproduct of conduct on the part 
of the defendant that has significant value to society. 
“(2) The victim knowingly submitted to the harmful conduct, 
even though the victim’s actions do not fully eliminate the defen-
dant’s liability for compensatory damages. 
“(3) The defendant has provided, or has attempted to provide, 
remuneration to substantially all of its victims. 
“(4) Although negligent, the defendant made some attempts to 
mitigate or eliminate the risk of harm.  If the defendant’s attempt to 
mitigate a risk of harm was the source of the harm in this case, that is 
also a mitigating factor. 
“If, by unanimous vote, you determine that the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors, you must then decide the dollar 
amount of punitive damages you will impose.  This should correlate to 
the reprehensibility of the conduct, both as that term is traditionally 
used and to the extent to which the defendant has avoided liability for 
similar harms in this state.  In determining what award to impose, you 
should be mindful that the Supreme Court of the United States has 
determined that, in most cases, punitive damages that are greater than 
ten times the awarded compensatory damages are unconstitutionally 
excessive.  Therefore, in only the most reprehensible of cases may you 
exceed that limit.  For example, you might exceed that limit if there 
are three aggravating factors present and no mitigating factors present. 
“Assuming that this is not such an exceptional case, you should 
treat the value of ten times compensatory damages as the upper limit 
to punitive damages.  You should start by considering two values—the 
corresponding civil or criminal penalties and the average punitive 
damages award for this type of conduct—both of which were argued 
during the punitive damages hearing.  You may choose one of these 
values to serve as a ‘baseline,’ or you can elect instead to pick a base-
line somewhere within these values. 
“Once you have chosen the baseline, you must then determine 
whether to depart from that baseline in an upward or a downward di-
rection.  You should only depart upward if aggravating factors sub-
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stantially outweigh mitigating factors:  for example, if there are mul-
tiple aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.  On the other 
hand, you should depart downward if aggravating factors outweigh 
mitigating factors only by a small amount.  The extent to which you 
depart from the baseline should mirror the degree to which you be-
lieve that aggravating factors dominate mitigating factors. 
“Please note the following subtle distinction:  you may not use puni-
tive damages to punish defendants for harms to individuals other than 
the defendant, but you may consider the possibility of harm to other 
individuals in determining the reprehensibility of the conduct.  Make 
sure that your choice of award considers the possibility that the defen-
dant’s conduct could harm many people but that your award does not 
attempt to punish the defendant for harm caused to nonparties. 
“Be mindful that the foreman has a special role in moderating de-
liberations.  The foreman is charged with ensuring a healthy debate 
between jurors who support an upward departure and jurors who sup-
port a downward departure.  Minority views should be treated with 
careful attention.  In addition, keep in mind that the process of delibe-
ration can lead groups to choose more extreme positions than any in-
dividual would initially support.  This means that you might choose a 
level of punitive damages higher or lower than any of you would have 
initially supported.  Be aware of this tendency, and if you believe that 
its effects are present, be sure to voice that concern. 
“Thank you for your service.” 
CONCLUSION 
The teachings of Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court’s recent 
punitive damages jurisprudence, and behavioral law and economics li-
terature may, when combined, provide suggestions for the creation of 
procedures that alleviate the potential constitutional infirmities of cur-
rent punitive damages statutes.  Above all, our punitive damages re-
gimes should attempt to guide the jury’s discretion such that the jury 
chooses to award punitive damages only when it is appropriate to do 
so, and such that the jury chooses a level of punitive damages that cor-
responds with reprehensibility and falls within defined limits.  The 
above proposal is just one suggestion for how a legislature, responsive to 
these three main concerns, could attempt to construct such a system. 
It seems that the variability of punitive damage awards, in addition 
to their occasional excessiveness, is an important problem that the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence declines to acknowledge.  Defendants 
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in punitive damages cases should begin reasserting as a defense the 
procedural guarantees of the due process clauses.  Such claims are not 
guaranteed success, but current developments in punitive damages 
scholarship may lead the Court to take these claims more seriously.  
Assuming that the Court will not force reform on the states, individu-
als should petition their state legislatures to reform punitive damages 
procedural schemes of their own volition.  And if these attempts at 
reform are successful, these states could finally boast that punitive 
damages are no longer the “monstrous heresy”195 that some have be-
lieved them to be. 
 
 
195 Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872). 
